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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of will substitutes, in general, and revocable trusts, in
particular, are on the rise. 1 Revocable trusts permit settlors to make inter
vivos asset transfers that provide for the disposition of those assets at
their death outside the probate system yet also enable them to retain
ultimate control of those assets during life through the power of
revocation. 2 The trend toward probate avoidance, however, has left one
group scrambling to find its place: creditors. 3 Traditionally, discharging
a decedent’s debts was an essential function of the probate process, and
creditor protection, one of its primary goals. 4 As Blackstone explained
more than two hundred years ago, “[I]t is [the executor’s] business first
of all to see whether there is a sufficient fund left to pay the debts of the
testator: the rule of equity being, that a man must be just before he is
permitted to be generous.” 5 Creditor protection, however, has not been
1. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1109-15 (1984) (noting that the use of will substitutes has become common
in the United States and outlining four primary types); David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code
(2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 186 (2002) (noting that
revocable trusts are the most common trusts in the United States and are used primarily as will
substitutes).
2. Alan Newman, Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, 43 REAL PROP.
TR. & EST. L.J. 523, 524 (2008) (describing the operation of revocable trusts).
3. Nathaniel W. Schwickerath, Note, Public Policy and the Probate Pariah: Confusion in
the Law of Will Substitutes, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 769, 796-97 (2000) (noting the trend toward probate
avoidance).
4. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1117 (discussing the three essential functions of probate: “(1)
making property owned at death marketable again (title-clearing); (2) paying off the decedent’s
debts (creditor protection); and (3) implementing the decedent’s donative intent respecting the
property that remains once the claims of creditors have been discharged (distribution)”);
Schwickerath, supra note 3, at 770 (noting that the law of succession has long valued creditor
protection); see also Richard J. Ruebel, Planning for the Impact of Creditors’ Claims Against a
Client’s Nonprobate Property, 15 EST. PLAN. 38, 38 (1988) (noting that handling claims against a
decedent’s probate estate is now a matter of routine).
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 283 (William C.
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built into the law of trusts as into the law of succession, although states
have recently begun to address some of the creditors’ rights issues
arising from the use of revocable trusts. 6
Ohio is among them. The Ohio legislature recently passed the Ohio
Trust Code, which primarily codified existing trust law. 7 In keeping with
the operation of revocable trusts and the principle that settlors should not
be able to use such trusts to avoid creditors, it provides that creditors
may claim the assets of a revocable trust during the lifetime of the
settlor. 8 It is, however, silent as to creditors’ ability to access trust funds
after the settlor’s death. 9 Two Ohio appellate courts have discussed the
statute, only to arrive at different conclusions regarding its operation and
significance in light of case precedent. 10
This Article will argue that the Ohio legislature should amend the
statute to permit creditors access to the assets of a revocable trust to
satisfy the settlor’s debts upon his death under certain limited
circumstances. Part II will discuss pertinent background, including the
nature and use of the revocable trust, creditors’ access to trust funds in
the past, and the development of Ohio’s statutory law on the subject.
Part III will set forth the conflict between the Ohio appellate courts in
more detail, framing the relevant issues. Part IV will consider the
arguments in favor of permitting creditors access to revocable trust funds
after the settlor’s death, while also proposing a method for so doing by
showing the following: first, it is in keeping with the principles of Ohio
law and public policy; second, it is in keeping with persuasive authority;
third, it is a question of statutory amendment for the legislature; fourth,
potential pitfalls can be avoided with careful drafting.

Sprague ed., 9th ed. 1915) (1892).
6. Ruebel, supra note 4, at 39 (discussing the nature of revocable trusts and recently adopted
statutes addressing creditors’ claims on their assets).
7. Alan Newman, The Uniform Trust Code: An Analysis of Ohio’s Version, 34 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 135, 136 (2008). The Ohio Trust Code became effective January 1, 2007. Id.
8. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A) (West, Westlaw through the 130th GA (20132014)) (“Whether or not the terms of the trust contain a spendthrift provision, all of the following
apply: (1) During the lifetime of the settlor, the property of a revocable trust is subject to claims of
the settlor’s creditors.”).
9. Id.
10. Sowers v. Luginbill, 175 Ohio App. 3d 745, 889 N.E.2d 172, 2008-Ohio-1486, at ¶¶ 13,
27-29 (concluding that O.R.C. § 5805.06(A)(1) does not permit subsequent creditors to file claims
to a settlor’s revocable trust and defining subsequent creditor as a person who files his claim after
the settlor’s death); Watterson v. Burnard, 986 N.E.2d 604, 608-11 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2013)
(concluding that O.R.C. § 5805.06(A)(1) permits all claims filed before the settlor’s death, even if
the settlor dies while the claim is pending, regardless of whether the claimant is a subsequent
creditor and declining to determine whether the claim must be filed before the settlor’s death).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF OHIO LAW ON CREDITORS’ ACCESS TO
REVOCABLE TRUST FUNDS
A.

Revocable Trusts

A revocable trust is created when the settlor transfers assets into the
trust but reserves an equitable life interest 11 and retains the power of
revocation and amendment. 12 With appropriate drafting, a revocable
trust “can replicate the incidents of a will.”13 The settlor typically names
remainder beneficiaries for whose benefit trust assets will be held or to
whom trust assets will be distributed upon the settlor’s death. 14 Because
the settlor, while living, can alter the terms of the trust, including its
beneficiary designations, the trustee owes the remainder beneficiaries no
duties until the trust becomes irrevocable upon the settlor’s death. 15 The
remainder beneficiaries of a revocable trust may not even be aware of
their interests in the trust. 16 Thus, although remainder beneficiaries
technically receive a beneficiary interest in trust property, this interest is
increasingly treated like an expectancy while the settlor is still living. 17
In sum, the revocable trust functions like a will but manages to avoid the
“cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive” process of estate
administration. 18 It is unsurprising that revocable trusts have become
popular estate planning devices in recent years. 19
B.

Precedent on Creditor Access to Revocable Trusts

Creditor avoidance has been another, though perhaps unintended,
advantage of employing a revocable trust as a will substitute. 20
Traditionally under Ohio law, after the death of a settlor of a revocable

11. A trust beneficiary does not hold legal title to trust assets but maintains an interest
enforceable in equity. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 885 (9th ed. 2009).
12. Newman, supra note 2, at 524; Langbein, supra note 1, at 1113.
13. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1113.
14. Newman, supra note 2, at 524.
15. Id. at 532-33.
16. Id. at 532.
17. Id. at 531-32.
18. Id. at 524.
19. English, supra note 1, at 186 (noting that “the extensive use of revocable trusts is a recent
phenomenon”).
20. Ruebel, supra note 4, at 41 (“Revocable trusts, of course, are not usually created to defeat
the claims of creditors, although they lend themselves well to that purpose.”). This is further
evidenced by scholarship recommending trust-drafting techniques to maximize asset protection
from creditors. See Dennis M. Sandoval, Drafting Trusts for Maximum Asset Protection from
Creditors, 17 NAELA, no. 5, 2004, at 10.
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trust, creditors of the settlor could not access assets placed in trust absent
intent to defraud. 21 As early as 1853, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed
asset transfers intended to defraud creditors in Crumbaugh v. Kugler. 22 It
cautioned that “[w]herever a person, largely indebted, gives away a large
amount of his property, without amply providing for the payment of his
debts, a suspicion of fraud will generally attach to the transaction.” 23 It
concluded that such transfers were invalid with respect to previous
creditors but valid with respect to subsequent creditors, absent intent to
defraud. 24 Ultimately, it held that no intent to defraud was present in
Crumbaugh, and the transfer did not prejudice the subsequent
creditors. 25
In 1880, the United States Supreme Court expounded on the
implication of fraud arising from the power of revocation in Jones v.
Clifton. 26 In that case, Clifton transferred land estates to his wife via a
deed in which he reserved the power of revocation and appointment to
other uses. 27 Subsequently, he filed for bankruptcy. 28 Jones, the assignee
in the bankruptcy, sought to include this property among his assets,
arguing that Clifton intended to defraud his future creditors while
retaining control and enjoyment of the property. 29 The Supreme Court
held that reserving the power of revocation and appointment to other
uses did not invalidate the transfer or demonstrate intent to defraud:
The insertion of the power of revocation and new appointment. . .tends
to show the contrary. Should he revoke the settlements, the property
would revert to him, and, of course, be liable for his debts; and should
he exercise the power of appointment for the benefit of others, the es30
tate appointed would be liable in equity for his debts.

Thus, the Court did not consider the power of revocation to be a property
interest against which creditors could levy a claim.
Finally, in 1939, the Ohio Supreme Court established the following
rule respecting revocable trusts in Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co.:
21. See Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 21 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 1939) (holding that, absent
intent to defraud, a revocable trust is not voidable by subsequent creditors).
22. Crumbaugh v. Kugler, 2 Ohio St. 373, 376-78 (1853) (discussing intent to defraud
creditors through a donative transfer).
23. Id. at 376.
24. Id. at 373.
25. Id. at 379.
26. See Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1880).
27. Id. at 226.
28. Id. at 227.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 230.
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Where the owner of property has conveyed it to another under a trust
instrument, containing a power of revocation, to hold such property for
the benefit and enjoyment of the settlor during his life and at his death
to distribute the same among designated beneficiaries, such trust, lack31
ing fraud, is not voidable by subsequent creditors.

The court did not explicitly define “subsequent creditor,” a term lifted
from Crumbaugh v. Kugler. 32 It cited Crumbaugh in explaining the
rationale for the rule. 33 Future creditors provide credit on the basis of the
debtor’s present assets, not on the basis of his or her past assets. 34 This
reiterates that the settlor of a revocable trust does not retain a property
interest in its assets. Thus, creditors whose claims arise after its creation
cannot access its funds.
This understanding is supported by the facts in Schofield. While
completely solvent, Ehert created and funded a revocable trust, reserving
the rights to receive any net income from the trust, occupy any real
estate included in the trust, and approve or deny sale of property
connected with the trust. 35 Upon his death, the trustee was to distribute
the property to Ehert’s wife and daughter. 36 Subsequently, Ehert
defaulted on rental payments to the plaintiff. 37 Shortly thereafter, he died
intestate. 38 The court held that the plaintiff had no claim to the trust
funds, because the trust was created before Ehert incurred the debt. 39 It
rejected the persuasive authorities cited by the plaintiff, noting that those
decisions were rendered under statutes which explicitly permitted
creditors to claim trust assets. 40 A settlor who reserved the power of
revocation or established the trust for personal use and enjoyment was
31. Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 21 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 1939). This remains the rule
under Ohio law today. Newman, supra note 7, at 175.
32. See Crumbaugh v. Kugler, 2 Ohio St. 373, 378-79 (1853) (distinguishing between prior
creditors and subsequent creditors); Schofield, 21 N.E.2d at 121 (noting that the rule in Ohio has
been that subsequent creditors may not set aside a transfer made by one while solvent). The Ohio
appellate districts have disagreed regarding the meaning and significance of “subsequent creditor”
in Schofield. Compare Sowers v. Luginbill, 175 Ohio App. 3d 745, 889 N.E.2d 172, 2008-Ohio1486, at ¶ 13 (holding that a subsequent creditor is one who files his claim after the settlor’s death),
with Watterson v. Burnard, 986 N.E.2d 604, 609 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a subsequent
creditor is one whose claim arises after creation of the trust, regardless of when he files his claim).
This disagreement will be discussed in Part III.
33. See Schofield, 21 N.E.2d at 122.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 120.
36. Id. at 121.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 121-23.
40. Id. at 123.
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“deemed the absolute owner of the estate conveyed as regards (to) the
right of creditors” by such statutes. 41 They treated a revocable trust as a
property interest held by the settlor even after death.42 The court
emphasized that Ohio law does not permit such claims, absent fraud.43
Thus, although present creditors may have a claim to trust assets,
creating a revocable trust can protect assets from future creditors. The
rule announced in Schofield placed the burden on creditors to ensure that
debtors could repay regardless of whether they had income from, or
access to, the assets of a revocable trust.
C.

Statutory Law on Creditor Access to Revocable Trusts

This burden, however, was complicated by Ohio statutory law,
which appeared to afford creditors some protection. The Ohio legislature
passed a law explicitly addressing creditors’ rights to revocable trust
assets in 1921, eighteen years prior to Schofield, in an amendment to
section 8617 of the General Code. 44 It provided some protection for
creditors:
All deeds of gifts and conveyance of real or personal property made in
trust for the exclusive use of the person or persons making the same
shall be void and of no effect, but the creator of a trust may reserve to
himself any use or power, beneficial or in trust, which he might lawfully grant to another, including the power to alter, amend or revoke such
trust, and such trust shall be valid as to all persons, except that any
beneficial interest reserved to such creator shall be subject to be
reached by the creditors of such creator, and except that where the creator of such trust reserves to himself for his own benefit a power of
revocation, a court of equity, at the suit of any creditor or creditors of
the creator, may compel the exercise of such power of revocation so
reserved, to the same extent and under the same conditions that such
45
creator could have exercised the same.

This statute explicitly endorsed revocable trusts but created a cause
of action for creditors against indebted settlors to reach the assets of such

41. Id. at 122.
42. Id. (noting that other jurisdictions permit creditors to claim trust assets even after the
settlor’s death).
43. Id. (“[A]fter the settlor’s death, if the trust was in reality fraudulent as to creditors, a
remedy would doubtless be available to the administrator or the creditors to subject the trust
property to the satisfaction of the settlor’s indebtedness.”).
44. See id. at 122.
45. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 6

390

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:383

trusts. 46 It did not stipulate whether this cause of action was available to
subsequent creditors, and the plain language suggested no limitation to
creditors whose claims arose prior to trust creation. The plaintiff in
Schofield was a subsequent creditor, but the court did not reach the
question of whether this status would bar his claim under section 8617 of
the General Code. 47 Instead, the court noted the statutory language
enabling creditors to compel exercise of the power of revocation “to the
same extent and under the same conditions” as the settlor could have
done. 48 The settlor’s power is personal: it ceases to exist upon his death,
and the trust becomes irrevocable.49 If the settlor cannot revoke the trust
after his death, his creditors cannot either. The court concluded that the
legislature would have provided differently if it had intended to permit
creditors to revoke a trust after the settlor’s death. 50 The plaintiff failed
to act while Ehert was living, and the statute was inapplicable to him for
that reason. 51 Thus, the court did not determine whether it was
inapplicable to him because he was a subsequent creditor.52 Following
the court’s reasoning, it seems that, if the legislature had intended to
distinguish the rights of prior creditors from those of subsequent
creditors, it would have done so explicitly. This suggests that the statute
recognized a present property interest in the assets of a revocable trust. If
the settlor retains a property interest in trust funds, creditors could
include that interest in determining how much credit to extend. 53
46. See Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 15 N.E.2d 627, 631 (Ohio 1938) (recognizing that
revocable trusts were valid because of section 8617 of the General Code); see also Union Trust Co.
v. Hawkins, 167 N.E. 389, 394-95 (Ohio 1929) (discussing the effect of the amendment to this
section which mentioned creditors).
47. See Schofield, 21 N.E.2d at 122.
48. See id.
49. Id.; see also Goldstein v. United States, No. 1:91CV0969, 1992 WL 402944, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 2, 1992) (noting that a deceased settlor had no property rights in trust assets when the
IRS issued a notice of assessment three years after his death because the trust became irrevocable at
that point).
50. Schofield, 21 N.E.2d at 122.
51. Id. at 123.
52. In Individual Business Services v. Carmack, the Second Appellate District interpreted the
subsequent version of this statute, O.R.C. § 1335.01(A), as permitting subsequent creditors to
compel revocation of the trust. See Individual Bus. Servs. v. Carmack, No. 24085, 2011-Ohio-1824,
¶ 62 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2011) (“Under the trust terms, Danies retained the power to revoke the
trust, and R.C. 1335.01(A) would have allowed IBS and CMC to compel her to revoke the trust and
subject the property in the trust to creditors’ claims. Accordingly, even if Danies did not have
existing creditors when the trust was created in 1998, or when the Mad River Property was placed in
the trust, future creditors could compel Danies to revoke the trust and allow assets to be used to pay
the creditors’ claims.”).
53. See Isabelle V. Taylor, Comment, Creditor Rights and the Missing Link in the Arkansas
Trust Code: Is Death Strong Enough “To Break the Chain?”, 65 ARK. L. REV. 433, 451 (2012)
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Nevertheless, the Schofield court established that creditors must act
during the settlor’s lifetime to succeed in making a claim. 54 Thus, the
protection extended by the statute was limited, and the burden remained
on creditors to assert claims as quickly as possible to keep them from
being barred by the settlor’s death.
The provisions of section 8617 of the General Code were included
in Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) section 1335.01 when it was passed in
1953. 55 It contained identical language and remained in effect until
January 1, 2007, when it was repealed by House Bill 416. 56 House Bill
416 included the new Ohio Trust Code, a modified version of the
Uniform Trust Code. 57 The Ohio Trust Code addressed “many issues
that formerly were either not addressed by Ohio law or were addressed
only in difficult to find case law.” 58 Its primary function regarding
creditors’ claims against settlors of revocable trusts was to codify
existing statutes and case law. 59 Thus, O.R.C. section 5805.06 provides,
“Whether or not the terms of the trust contain a spendthrift provision . . .
[d]uring the lifetime of the settlor, the property of a revocable trust is
subject to the claims of the settlor’s creditors.” 60 It remains silent as to
creditors’ ability to access trust assets after the settlor’s death, notably
omitting section 505(a)(3) of the Uniform Trust Code. 61 Therefore, the
(discussing views on the nature of the interest passed to beneficiaries when a revocable trust is
created and their implications for creditors).
54. Schofield, 21 N.E.2d at 122.
55. Prestige Vacations, Inc. v. Kozak, 471 F. Supp. 410, 411 (N.D. Ohio. 1979) (quoting the
language of O.R.C. § 1335.01 and applying the Schofield court’s analysis of the “predecessor
statute”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.01 (West, Westlaw through the 130th GA (2013-2014))
(noting it was enacted by House Bill 1 in 1953).
56. See Prestige, 471 F. Supp. at 411 (quoting O.R.C. § 1335.01); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1335.01 (noting the statute’s repeal in 2007).
57. Newman, supra note 7, at 136; see also English, supra note 1, at 144-52 (discussing
creation of the Uniform Trust Code). Regarding the Ohio Trust Code’s relation to the Uniform Trust
Code, Prof. Newman explains, “Shortly after the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Trust Code (‘UTC’) in August of 2000, members of the
Estate Planning, Trust, and Probate Law (‘EPTPL’) Section of the Ohio State Bar Association, and
members of the Legal, Legislative, and Regulatory (‘LLR’) Committee of the Ohio Bankers
League, began studying it. In 2003, a joint committee of members of the EPTPL Section and the
LLR Committee (the ‘Joint Committee’) was formed to continue that study. Over the next three
years, the Joint Committee worked on a modified version of the UTC that resulted in the enactment
in 2006 of House Bill 416, which includes the new Ohio Trust Code (the ‘OTC,’ or the ‘Code’).”
Newman, supra note 7, at 135-36.
58. Newman, supra note 7, at 136.
59. Id. at 172-73.
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A)(1).
61. Newman, supra note 7, at 175. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A)(1). Uniform
Trust Code § 505(a)(3) provides that creditors may assert claims against revocable trust assets after
the death of the settlor when his probate estate is insufficient to satisfy them: “Whether or not the
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rule announced in Schofield remains intact. 62
III. SHOULD CREDITORS BE ABLE TO ACCESS THE ASSETS OF
REVOCABLE TRUSTS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE SETTLOR UNDER OHIO
LAW
A.

The Third Appellate District

The Ohio Supreme Court has not had opportunity to examine
section 5805.06 of the Ohio Trust Code. Two appellate courts, however,
have addressed it and have taken different positions regarding its
interpretation and significance. In Sowers v. Luginbill, the Third
Appellate District attempted to reconcile section 5805.06(A)(1) with the
Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Schofield. 63 Gordon Sowers caused an
automobile accident, which injured Melanie Luginbill. 64 Luginbill
subsequently filed a negligence suit against him. 65 After the suit was
filed, Sowers died unexpectedly. 66 John Sowers, Gordon’s brother, was
executor of his estate, and he filed an action for declaratory judgment,
arguing that the assets of his brother’s revocable trust could not be used
to satisfy Luginbill’s personal injury claims. 67 The trial court ruled in
Luginbill’s favor on the negligence claims and held that she could
satisfy those claims from the trust assets. 68 Sowers appealed, but the
appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court. 69
The Third Appellate District first defined “subsequent creditor” in a
manner that reconciled it with the Schofield holding and the plain
language of the present statute. According to the appellate court, a
subsequent creditor is one “whose claim comes into existence after a
terms of a trust contain a spendthrift provision . . . [a]fter the death of a settlor, and subject to the
settlor’s right to direct the source from which liabilities will be paid, the property of a trust that was
revocable at the settlor’s death is subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors, costs of administration
of the settlor’s estate, the expenses of the settlor’s funeral and disposal of remains, and [statutory
allowances] to a surviving spouse and children to the extent the settlor’s probate estate is inadequate
to satisfy those claims, costs, expenses, and [allowances].” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(3) (West
2013).
62. Newman, supra note 7, at 175.
63. Sowers v. Luginbill, 175 Ohio App. 3d 745, 889 N.E.2d 172, 2008-Ohio-1486, at ¶¶ 12,
17-29. See generally Michael A. Ogline, Sowers v. Luginbill: A Chink in the Schofield Armor?, 19
OHIO PROB. L.J. 15 (2008) (analyzing the Sowers court’s approach to Schofield).
64. Sowers, 2008-Ohio-1486 at ¶ 2.
65. Id. at ¶ 3.
66. Id. at ¶ 4.
67. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.
68. Id. at ¶ 7.
69. Id. at ¶ 46.
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given fact or transaction.” 70 The relevant fact or transaction to determine
subsequent creditor status is the death of the settlor. 71 The appellate
court pointed out that the Schofield court emphasized that the plaintiff
failed to file his claim before Ehert’s death even though his claim arose
during Ehert’s lifetime. 72 Thus, the statute was inapplicable to him. 73 It
distinguished the present case from Schofield because Luginbill filed her
claim prior to Sowers’ death. 74 This characterization of subsequent
creditor status does not strictly fit within the definition offered by the
Schofield court, as it does not depend on when the claim comes into
existence but rather on when the claim is filed.75 It further ignores the
discussion in Schofield regarding the Crumbaugh precedent and the fact
that Ehert was solvent when he created the trust.76 It does, however,
succeed in clarifying the Schofield opinion in light of the present statute
and clearly bars all claims not filed before the settlor’s death. 77
The Third Appellate District noted that the present statute promotes
creditor protection. 78 First, it permits creditors to reach funds of an
irrevocable trust to the degree that the settlor retains an interest in
them. 79 The court explained, “By providing protection for creditors in
either circumstance, it is evident that the legislature sought to provide
comprehensive creditor protection.” 80 Second, the court cited the
Official Comment to section 5805.06(A)(1) of the Uniform Trust Code,
which also emphasized that the purpose of the section is creditor
protection. 81 Thus, the court rejected Sowers’ argument that the
definitive event regarding creditor status was the creation and funding of
the trust. 82 This would conflict with the legislature’s purpose of
70. Id. at ¶ 13.
71. Id.
72. Id. at ¶ 16.
73. Id.
74. Id. at ¶ 17.
75. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text. The Third Appellate District cites three
policy considerations which support its “finding that the settlor’s death is the event that determines a
creditor’s status for the purposes of accessing trust property.” Sowers, 2008-Ohio-1486 at ¶ 23.
First, the date of death is a time certain. Id. Second, the date of death is expedient, permitting
interests to vest immediately and encouraging the prompt filing of claims. Id. Third, the date of
death promotes judicial economy. Id.
78. Sowers, 2008-Ohio-1486 at ¶ 40.
79. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A)(2) (West, Westlaw through the 130th GA (20132014)).
80. Sowers, 2008-Ohio-1486 at ¶ 40.
81. Id. at ¶ 41.
82. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.
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comprehensive creditor protection by unnecessarily limiting trust access
to creditors whose claims were filed before its creation or funding. 83
Once again, this understanding depends on the date the claim was filed
rather than the date on which the claim arose. Nevertheless, a bright line
rule prevents the court from engaging in potentially complicated
analysis. 84
B.

The Sixth Appellate District

The clear implication of the holding in Sowers is, under O.R.C.
section 5805.06(A)(1), a revocable trust becomes irrevocable upon the
settlor’s death, and in order to reach its funds, creditors must file their
claim prior to the settlor’s death, regardless of when their claim arose
and regardless of whether the settlor dies while the claim is still pending.
The Sixth Appellate District, on the other hand, found O.R.C. section
5805.06(A)(1) more ambiguous, on nearly identical facts. In Watterson
v. Burnard, Brad Watterson was injured in an automobile accident
caused by Barthel Burnard and filed a negligence suit. 85 Burnard, who
had created a revocable trust during her lifetime, passed away while the
lawsuit was pending. 86 Upon Burnard’s death, Watterson filed a
complaint seeking declaratory judgment that Burnard’s trust assets could
be used to satisfy his personal injury claims and injunctive relief
prohibiting the successor trustee from transferring assets out of the
trust. 87 The trial court held that Watterson, as Burnard’s creditor, lost all
rights to access trust funds upon Burnard’s death. 88 The Sixth Appellate
District disagreed and reversed the trial court’s holding. 89
It first analyzed the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in Schofield,
noting its interpretation of section 8617 of the General Code and the
facts upon which it was based. 90 It then considered the Third District’s
discussion of Schofield in Sowers. 91 The Sixth District rejected the Third
District’s understanding of what “subsequent creditor” means but agreed

83. Id. at ¶ 28.
84. See id. at ¶ 27 (discussing trusts created by multiple fund transfers).
85. Watterson v. Burnard, 986 N.E.2d 604, 605 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2013); see generally Michael
A. Ogline, Watterson v. Burnard: Is Schofield Still Relevant?, 23 OHIO PROB. L.J. NL 6, no. 5, 2013
(comparing the Watterson opinion with the Schofield opinion).
86. Watterson, 986 N.E.2d at 605.
87. Id.
88. Id.at 606.
89. Id. at 611.
90. See id. at 606-07 (discussing the Schofield opinion).
91. See id. at 607-09 (discussing the Sowers opinion).
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that the purpose of O.R.C. section 5805.06(A)(1) is creditor protection. 92
It emphasized:
The term “subsequent creditor” was not defined in the Schofield decision. Rather, the term was used in the context of explaining that creditors seeking to set aside a voluntary conveyance or declaration of a
trust, made before their claim arose and while the debtor was solvent,
cannot reach the trust’s assets without a showing of “actual intent to
defraud such creditors.” Schofield, 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119, at
paragraph two of the syllabus. This reference to a “subsequent creditor” does not even come close to suggesting that the date of the settlor’s death should be determinative of whether or not an individual
93
claimant is or is not a “subsequent creditor.”

Thus, according to the Sixth District, to determine whether a
creditor is subsequent, the date on which the claim arose should be
compared with the date on which the trust was created or funded. 94 If the
claim arose after the trust was created or after certain assets were
transferred into it, the creditor is subsequent.95 This is in keeping with
well-established Ohio law that tort claimants become creditors at the
moment their cause of action accrues. 96 The court admitted that,
according to this definition, Watterson was a subsequent creditor. 97 It
did not, however, find this troubling, even in light of the Schofield
holding. 98 The Schofield court based its decision on section 8617 of the
General Code, finding that this statute required that claims be brought
during the lifetime of the settlor. 99 Watterson filed his claim while
Burnard was still living, as required by the Schofield court under the
General Code and clearly within the confines of O.R.C. section
5805.06(A)(1). 100
The Sixth District considered this further evidence of the
legislature’s intent to increase creditor protection by allowing even
subsequent creditors to access revocable trust funds. 101 It confirmed that
the settlor should not be permitted to use a revocable trust to shield

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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himself from creditor claims. 102 An arbitrary event during pending
litigation, such as the settlor’s death, should not prevent creditors from
satisfying a judgment from trust assets if the settlor could have accessed
those assets while living. 103 Furthermore, the court explicitly declined to
decide whether a creditor must file his claim during the settlor’s lifetime
in order to access trust assets under O.R.C. section 5805.06(A)(1). 104
Thus, unlike in the Third Appellate District, the question whether
creditors can reach revocable trust assets after the settlor’s death remains
unanswered in the Sixth District. More expansive creditor protection
may be available under O.R.C. section 5805.06(A)(1).
The Sixth District, therefore, essentially dismissed the Schofield
court’s discussion of subsequent creditors as dicta, instead focusing on
the similarities between the previous statute and the present one and
distinguishing the cases based on the facts. However, this fails to
account for the presence of the term “subsequent creditor” in the rule
announced by the Schofield court. Furthermore, if the prior statute
permitted creditors’ access to trust funds during the settlor’s lifetime but
not after, the same analysis should apply to the present statute.
Nevertheless, the Sixth District hesitated to draw that conclusion on the
facts before it and did not consider whether the Schofield holding applies
to Ohio’s new trust code in light of its increased emphasis on creditor
protection. 105
C.

Resolving the Conflict

Even under the recently enacted Ohio Trust Code, Ohio law
remains undecided regarding whether the assets of a revocable trust are
subject to creditors’ claims filed after the death of the settlor. The
opinions in Schofield and Sowers suggest they are not, but the Watterson
court casts doubt on that conclusion. Either way, creditors find
themselves in a difficult position, uncertain of their rights or hurrying to
file their claims before an unexpected death. To address whether
creditors should be able to reach revocable trust funds after the settlor’s
death, it is necessary to consider the purposes and policies underlying
the enactment of the Ohio Trust Code. Persuasive authority also sheds
light on the issue. If creditors should be permitted access to trust assets
after the settlor’s death, it becomes necessary to consider how that is
102.
103.
104.
105.

See id. at 609-11.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 611 n.5.
See id. at 610-11.
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best accomplished: Must the legislature amend the statute? Under what
circumstances may trust funds be accessed? Does the trustee owe
creditors any duties? How soon must claims be filed?
Discussion of these issues will conclude that the legislature should
amend the statute to:
(1) permit creditors access to the assets of a revocable trust after the
settlor’s death to satisfy his debts
(2) regardless of when their claims arose
(3) provided that the probate estate is insufficient,
(4) the trustee meets certain, limited duties,
(5) and creditors file their claims within a reasonable statute of limitations.

IV. CREDITORS SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCESS THE ASSETS OF A
REVOCABLE TRUST AFTER THE DEATH OF THE SETTLOR
The Ohio legislature should amend the statute to permit creditors
access to the assets of a revocable trust to satisfy the settlor’s debts upon
his or her death under certain, limited, circumstances. Such an
amendment is in keeping with the principles of Ohio law, public policy,
and persuasive authority. Finally, the carefully drafted amendment
should define “creditor,” recognize circumstances in which creditors
should be permitted to access revocable trust funds, and outline trustees’
duties respecting creditors and creditors’ obligations respecting claims.
A.

Permitting Creditors Access to the Assets of a Revocable Trust is in
Keeping with the Principles of Ohio Law and Public Policy

Ohio courts agree that settlors should not be able to use revocable
trusts to protect themselves from creditors. As early as 1853, precedent
established that debtors must consider their creditors before giving away
their property: “[A] man largely indebted . . . cannot make a gift of his
property without the most careful regard to the rights of his creditors.
And such gift is never upheld, unless property, clearly and beyond
doubt, is retained sufficient to pay all the donor’s debts.” 106 Both the
Third and the Sixth Appellate Districts cited the Official Comments to
the Uniform Trust Code section 5805.06(A), as well as relevant sections

106.
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of the Restatement of Trusts. 107 The Official Comment to the Uniform
Trust Code section 5805.06(A) maintains that permitting creditors
access to trust funds is “now a well accepted conclusion,” although this
was not always the case under common law. 108 The Ohio Trust Code
thus advances the principle that settlors may not simultaneously enjoy
the benefits of trust assets and shield those assets from creditors. 109 This
is in keeping with the trend noted in The Restatement of Trusts: case and
statutory law increasingly recognizes that the testator’s creditors and the
settlor’s creditors are in the same position “because both the testator and
the settlor have retained . . . complete control over the property . . .
subject to the will or trust instrument.” 110 The natural conclusion is that
they be afforded the same protections. In fact, the one point on which the
Third and Sixth Appellate Districts agree is that the ultimate purpose of
O.R.C. section 5805.06(A) is creditor protection. 111 Permitting creditors
access to revocable trust assets upon the settlor’s death ensures that
settlors cannot employ the revocable trust as a shield.
Ohio statutory law recognized that the settlor’s interest in a
revocable trust is real and substantial when it first permitted creditors to
compel settlors to exercise their power of revocation. 112 Although the
common law held that the settlor of a revocable trust conveyed to the
remainder beneficiaries a present interest subject to defeasance, 113 this
interest actually operates like an expectancy. 114 The settlor creates a
revocable trust to retain control over his or her property, and the
adjective “nontestamentary” does not necessarily indicate the nature of
the interest created. 115 When the Ohio legislature created a cause of
action for creditors of settlors of revocable trusts, it essentially endorsed
inclusion of trust funds in creditors’ risk assessment. This right has little
meaning, however, unless creditors can claim trust assets after the

107. See Sowers v. Luginbill, 175 Ohio App. 3d 745, 889 N.E.2d 172, 2008-Ohio-1486, at ¶
41 (quoting the Official Comment to O.R.C. § 5805.06(A) and the Restatement); Watterson, 986
N.E.2d at 608-09 (quoting the Official Comment to O.R.C. § 5805.06(A) and the Restatement).
108. Sowers, 2008-Ohio-1486 at ¶ 41.
109. Id at ¶ 42.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. a (2003).
111. See Sowers, 2008-Ohio-1486 at ¶ 40 (stating that the purpose of the statute is creditor
protection); Watterson, 986 N.E.2d at 610 (agreeing with the Third District’s analysis of the policy
and purpose underlying the statute).
112. See Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 21 N.E.2d 119, 120, 122 (Ohio 1939) (quoting
section 8617 of the General Code).
113. A defeasible interest is one that “the holder may enjoy until the occurrence of a
condition.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 885 (9th ed. 2009).
114. Taylor, supra note 53, at 451; Newman, supra note 2, at 531.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 110, § 25 cmt b.
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settlor’s death, as it can be lost most unexpectedly. This is more of a
concern now, as the use of revocable trusts as will substitutes has
increased in popularity. 116 Because assets can be transferred without
probate, decedents’ probate estates may not contain sufficient funds to
satisfy creditors. 117 Ohio law should adapt to reflect this reality, just as it
adapted to reflect the reality of the settlor’s interest in the trust. Allowing
creditors to reach trust funds after the settlor’s death acknowledges the
true nature of the settlor’s interest in the funds and guards creditors’
rights without disturbing the use of revocable trusts for probate
avoidance purposes.
B.

Permitting Creditors Access to the Assets of a Revocable Trust is in
Keeping with Persuasive Authorities
1. The Uniform Trust Code

Many other jurisdictions have recognized the need to draft statutes
that specifically address creditors’ rights in the context of the increased
use of will substitutes, like the revocable trust. State courts have handed
down judgments addressing creditors’ rights in absence of statutory
authority 118 and have interpreted statutory law in favor of creditors’
rights. 119 State legislatures have passed laws that address creditor access
to revocable trust assets in some detail. 120 Perhaps the most significant
step was the creation of the Uniform Trust Code. The Uniform Trust
Code was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 2000 and by the American Bar Association’s
House of Delegates in 2001. 121 Its drafting “was prompted by the much
greater use of trusts in recent years” and the “recognition . . . that the
trust law in most states is thin, with many gaps between the often few
statutes and reported cases.” 122 Section 505(a)(3) answers the question of
whether creditors may claim revocable trust assets upon the settlor’s
death in the affirmative.123 Its reasoning is simple: “Because a revocable
trust is usually employed as a will substitute, it is appropriate to subject
trust assets at the settlor’s death to the claims of the settlor’s creditors
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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and other estate-related expenses.” 124 The Uniform Trust Code provides
that creditors may recover trust assets only to the degree that the settlor’s
probate estate is insufficient, and it does not establish guidelines for
statutes of limitations or trustee duties. 125 “The appropriate answers to
these questions will depend on the particulars of the state’s probate
code.” 126 Since its creation in 2000, twenty-five states and Washington,
D.C. have adopted the Uniform Trust Code. 127 Of those twenty-six, only
three states, Ohio among them, have declined to include some version of
section 505(a)(3) to address creditors’ claims after the settlor’s death. 128
Most states, however, adopted either the exact language used by the
drafters of the Uniform Trust Code 129 or a modified version, addressing
details left unanswered by the Uniform Trust Code provision. 130
2. State Court Decisions
The Uniform Trust Code was not the first authority to acknowledge
creditor claims against a deceased settlor’s revocable trust. State courts
had begun to address creditor rights long before, even in the absence of
statutory law. In State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Reiser, a
Massachusetts appellate court permitted a creditor to reach trust assets
after the settlor’s death. 131 In that case, Wilfred Dunnebier executed a
revocable trust instrument, reserving the right to direct the disposition of
124. English, supra note 1, at 193.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. The Uniform Trust Code states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia,
Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Legislation to enact the Uniform Trust Code has been introduced in New Jersey. Legislative Fact
LAW
COMM’N,
http://uniformlaws.org/
Sheet
–
Trust
Code,
UNIFORM
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
128. Taylor, supra note 53, at 438-39; see MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-505 (West, Westlaw
through the 97th GA (2014)) (omitting § 505(a)(3)); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-505 (West, Westlaw
through the 2d Ex. Sess. (2014)) (omitting § 505(a)(3)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06 (West,
Westlaw through the 130th GA (2013-2014)) (omitting § 505(a)(3)).
129. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10505(A)(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2015
legislation of the 52nd legislature) (adopting § 505(a)(3) as is); D.C. CODE § 19-1305.05(a)(3)
(West, Westlaw through Feb. 18, 2015) (adopting § 505(a)(3) as is); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 303850(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (adopting § 505(a)(3) as is).
130. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.05053 (West, Westlaw through chapter 255 of the 2014 Sess.
and Spec. “A” Sess. of the 23rd legislature) (adopting a modified version of § 505(a)(3)); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-7-505(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (adopting a modified version of §
505(a)(3)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7605 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2015, No. 4, of the
2015 Sess., 98th legislature) (adopting a modified version of § 505(a)(3)).
131. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 389 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Mass. 1979).
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principal and income, and transferred the capital stock of five
corporations into it. 132 Immediately following, he executed a will leaving
his residuary estate to the trust. 133 Subsequently, he applied to the
plaintiff bank for a loan of $75,000, which the bank approved partly on
the basis of the corporate stock. 134 Four months later, Dunnebier was
killed in an accident. 135 His probate estate was insufficient to repay his
debt. 136 The court first remarked that, according to Massachusetts
common law, the plaintiff bank could have reached Dunnebier’s trust
assets while he was living. 137 It also noted the holding of the Schofield
court and commented that Massachusetts courts have always given full
effect to the terms of a revocable trust, even when this resulted in the
disinheritance of a spouse or child in contravention of statutory
policies. 138 Revocable trusts that operate to creditors’ disadvantage,
absent fraud, may be no different. 139 Ultimately, however, the court
announced the following rule:
Where a person places property in trust and reserves the right to amend
and revoke, or to direct disposition of principal and income, the settlor’s creditors may, following the death of the settlor, reach in satisfaction of the settlor’s debts to them, to the extent not satisfied by the
settlor’s estate, those assets owned by the trust over which the settlor
had such control at the time of his death as would have enabled the set140
tlor to use the trust assets for his own benefit.

The court cited several considerations in support of its holding.
First, the power of appointment, under which property constitutes an
asset available to creditors, is similar to the creation of a revocable trust,
suggesting that the same principle applies to the latter.141 Second,
revocable trusts function most commonly as estate planning devices, and
thus, less attention ought to be paid to the form of the property than the
purpose it serves. 142 Finally, it is a violation of public policy to allow “an
individual to have an estate to live on, but not an estate to pay his debts

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
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with.” 143
Similarly, in Matter of Kovalyshyn’s Estate, a New Jersey probate
court ruled that a decedent-settlor’s trust assets could be used to pay his
debts and estate administration costs. 144 Kovalyshyn’s probate estate was
insufficient to discharge the debts incurred during his final illness and
funeral arrangements. 145 Prior to his death, however, Kovalyshyn had
invested in some mutual funds and placed the shares in trust, reserving
the power of revocation to himself and naming his son as the beneficiary
upon his death. 146 The value of the mutual fund shares was sufficient to
pay the debts of his estate. 147 The issue before the court was whether the
trust assets could be used to pay the decedent’s debts. 148 The court first
noted that there was no evidence of intent to defraud in the trust
creation. 149 It then compared the decedent’s revocable trust to a savings
account trust or a Totten trust, noting that both permit settlors to retain
control over their assets. 150 In New Jersey, creditors can claim savings
account trust funds during the settlor’s lifetime. 151 The court cited the
persuasive authority of New York law as a guide, which also permits
settlor-decedents’ debts and funeral expenses to be discharged from a
savings account trust. 152 It reasoned that revocable trusts should also be
applied to settlor-decedents’ probate obligations, explaining that
Kovalyshyn “did not intend to strip himself of control . . . of these funds
during his lifetime.” 153 He merely intended to give the beneficiary
whatever remained, if anything, at his death. 154 The court held that death
should not “[cheat] the settlor and his creditors of their opportunity to
settle these just debts.” 155
The Iowa Supreme Court also noted the arbitrary effect of a rule
that permits creditors access to revocable trust funds prior to the settlor’s

143. Id.
144. In re Estate of Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d 852, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. Pr. Div. 1975).
145. Id. at 854.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 854-55.
149. Id. at 858.
150. Id. at 858-59. See Kara Peischl Marcus, Totten Trusts: Pragmatic Pre-Death Planning or
Post-Mortem Plunder?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 861, 865-69 (1996) (discussing Totten trusts in more
detail).
151. In re Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d at 858.
152. Id. at 858-59.
153. Id. at 859.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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death but not after it. 156 In Phillips v. Roe, Malcom and Lenore Roe
created two revocable trusts. 157 They were subsequently killed in an
automobile collision, which also killed Barbara Nagel. 158 The estate of
Nagel filed a wrongful death suit and sought a declaratory judgment that
the Roes’ trust assets could be used to satisfy the judgment. 159 The court
agreed that the judgment could be satisfied from the trust assets,
remarking, “[I]t would be inequitable to shield the assets from the
plaintiff’s contingent claim only because the Roes died . . . .” 160 If the
Roes had survived the crash, they could have accessed those funds to
pay the judgment. 161 The court noted that a settlor’s power to revoke the
trust technically expires upon his death but rejected the Schofield
precedent, concluding, “We however think the better authority is to the
contrary.” 162 Thus, as revocable trusts began to increase in popularity,
courts began to recognize the need for law addressing creditor access to
trust assets after the death of the settlor even in the absence of legislative
action.
Courts also looked to statutory authority, such as fraudulent transfer
laws, to guide their discussion of creditor rights, frequently interpreting
statutory provisions in creditors’ favor. For instance, in Johnson v.
Commercial Bank, the Oregon Supreme Court held settlors’ deaths did
not defeat their creditors’ claim under Oregon Revised Statute
(“O.R.S.”) section 95.060. 163 Elmer White created a revocable trust, and
he and his wife, Ruth, transferred all of their assets into it. 164 Mr. White,
who was in ill health, hired the plaintiff, a nurse, to care for him at
home. 165 Subsequently, Mrs. White fell ill too, and the plaintiff agreed to
care for her, as well, for an additional wage.166 The plaintiff, however,
never received the additional wages. 167 She filed a claim against the
Whites’ probate estates after their deaths. 168 The probate estates were
bankrupt, so the plaintiff sought to satisfy her claim from the revocable
156. Phillips v. Roe (In re Estate of Nagel), 580 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1998).
157. Id. at 811.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 812.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Johnson v. Commercial Bank, 588 P.2d 1096, 1100 (Or. 1978). Oregon Revised Statute §
95.060 was repealed in 1985. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 95.060 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).
164. Johnson, 588 P.2d at 1097.
165. Id. at 1098.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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trust assets on the authority of O.R.S. section 95.060: “All deeds of gift,
all conveyances and all verbal or written transfers or assignments of
goods, chattels or things in action, are void as against the creditors,
existing or subsequent, of such person.” 169
Finding no Oregon authority on point, the court looked to a Kansas
opinion construing a similar statute for guidance. 170 It dealt with a settlor
who created a life estate for himself but attempted to retain the right to
control distribution of trust assets. 171 The Oregon court agreed with the
holding of the Kansas court: a settlor’s “property ‘should be subject to
the payment of his debts, although he has vested nominal title thereto in
some other persons.’” 172 The defendants attempted to argue that the
plaintiff should have filed her claim prior to the Whites’ deaths.173 The
court disagreed and held that “creditors may reach such assets even after
the settlor dies, subject only to the rule of laches.” 174
The Supreme Court of Alabama came to the same conclusion after
examining a similar statute. 175 Alabama Code section 8-9-7 provided,
“All deeds of gift, conveyances, transfers and assignments, verbal or
written of goods, chattels or things in actions, made in trust for the use of
the person making the same, are void against creditors, existing or
subsequent, of such a person.” 176 Thus, this statute specifically applied
to revocable trusts, although it does not use that language. In Giles v.
Ingrum, Lillie Mae Jones created a revocable trust and later died in an
automobile collision. 177 The driver and passenger of the other vehicle
involved obtained a judgment against her estate, which they assigned to
Charles Ingrum. 178 Ingrum sought to satisfy his judgment from the assets
of Jones’ trust. 179 The court agreed that he could do so, citing the
legislature’s comments to section 8-9-7: “The reason for this section is
clear; a debtor cannot be allowed to defeat the legitimate claims of his
creditors, whether existing or subsequent, by transferring his property to
another while continuing to enjoy the use and benefit of that
property.” 180 The court did not even mention the issue of whether Jones’
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 1098, 1099.
Id. at 1099.
Id. (quoting Herd v. Chambers, 149 P.2d 583, 589 (Kan. 1944)).
Id. at 1100.
Id.
See Giles v. Ingrum, 583 So.2d 1287, 1289 (Ala. 1991).
Id. at 1288. Alabama Code § 8-9-7 was repealed in 1989. Id.
Id. at 1287-88.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1288-89.
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death should bar Ingrum’s access to trust assets. 181 Ingrum did not
receive the judgment until at least two years after Jones’ death; 182
nevertheless, the court found the trust was void and could be used to
satisfy his claim. 183 Apparently, it did not consider Jones’ death a
problem. 184
A recent opinion from the Illinois Supreme Court, Rush University
Medical Center v. Sessions, came down strongly in favor of creditors’
rights in the face of potentially contradictory legislative authority. 185 The
facts and procedural history are as follows: Robert Sessions established
two trusts during his lifetime, the “Sessions Family Trust” and the
“Robert W. Sessions Revocable Living Trust.” 186 He also pledged $1.5
million to Rush University Medical Center for new construction on
campus. 187 Rush University, in reliance on his pledge, began and
completed the building project, dedicating the new structure to
Sessions. 188 Sessions, however, failed to make any payments on the

181. See id.
182. Id. at 1288.
183. Id. at 1290.
184. Neither did the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v.
Walter E. Heller & Co.. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 204 So.2d 856, 862
(Miss. 1967). There, the court concluded, “In our opinion the creditors had a claim against this trust
before the death of the grantor. We cannot conceive that his death would bar their claim; and we
hold that a claim of creditors against said property is not defeated merely by the death of the
debtor.” Id.
185. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d 45, 58 (Ill. 2012). Illinois has no statutory
provisions specifically addressing creditor rights to trust assets after the settlor’s death, so this case
remains the authority in Illinois. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-5/21 (West, Westlaw through
2014 Sess.) (the Trust and Trustees Act does not discuss creditors’ claims against a deceased
settlor). 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2 2-1403, however, states, “No court, except as otherwise provided
in this Section, shall order the satisfaction of a judgment out of any property held in trust for the
judgment debtor if such trust has, in good faith, been created by, or the fund so held in trust has
proceeded from, a person other than the judgment debtor.” (Emphasis added.) The negative
implication of this statute is that a court may order satisfaction of a judgment from property held in
trust for a judgment debtor who created the trust.
186. Rush Univ., 980 N.E.2d at 48. The “Sessions Family Trust” was irrevocable, but Sessions
was its lifetime beneficiary and retained absolute power to appoint and remove trustees and veto
their discretionary actions. Id. The court did not distinguish between the revocable and irrevocable
trusts throughout the opinion. See id. at 49-56. Revocable trusts and irrevocable, self-settled trusts
operate according to the same principle, permitting the settlor-beneficiary to control or use their
assets. Thus, both follow the public policy prohibiting creditor avoidance. In fact, most states,
including Ohio, permit creditors to reach irrevocable trust assets to the same degree that settlors can
reach them. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A)(2) (West, Westlaw through the 130th GA
(2013-2014)); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 505(1)(B) (West, Westlaw through chapter 1 of the 2015
first session of the 127th legislature).
187. Rush Univ., 980 N.E.2d at 48.
188. Id. at 49.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 6

406

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:383

pledge in the next ten years before his death. 189 After his death, Rush
University filed a claim in probate court to enforce the pledge only to
discover Sessions’ estate contained less than $100,000. 190 The trial court
ruled that Rush University could satisfy the pledge from the trusts’
assets based on the common law principle that self-settled trusts are void
as to creditors, but the appellate court reversed.191 It held that Illinois’
Fraudulent Transfer Act, which required certain findings to invalidate a
transfer, superseded the common law rule. 192
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment
and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. 193 First, noting that both laws
served to protect creditors, it held the common law rule invalidating selfsettled trusts supplemented rather than contradicted the Fraudulent
Transfer Act. 194 The court then turned to the defendants’ argument that
the common law rule applies only to creditors who file claims within the
settlor’s lifetime. 195 The relevant inquiry was, contrary to the
defendants’ supposition, whether and to what degree trust assets could
have been accessed by the settlor during his lifetime. 196 In this instance,
the trustees, who could be removed and reappointed by Sessions, were to
distribute both principal and income to Sessions “in unlimited
amounts.” 197 “Sessions’ interest extended to the entire trust,” and
creditors could reach that interest. 198 The fact that Rush University failed
to obtain a judgment prior to Sessions’ death was immaterial. 199 The
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 50.
192. Id. The relevant portion of the Illinois Fraudulent Transfer Act provided the following:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether
the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(B) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
740 ILL. COMP..STAT. 160/5(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).
193. Rush Univ., 980 N.E.2d at 58.
194. Id. at 51-54.
195. Id. at 54-55.
196. Id. at 55.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 56 (“Thus, we believe that if the settlor’s interest in a self-settled trust is ‘void’
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court cited persuasive authority in support of its holding, including
Johnson and Phillips. 200 Sessions was a debtor of Rush University, and
Rush University, a creditor of Sessions. 201 As such, the court required
Sessions “to be just before he was generous,” even after death: Rush
University could satisfy its claims from the trust assets. 202
3. Statutory Law
Courts were not alone in recognizing the necessity of requiring
justice before generosity. Even before creation of the Uniform Trust
Code, several state legislatures drafted statutes permitting creditors to
access trust assets after the settlor’s death in certain circumstances. For
instance, in 1985, the Nevada legislature passed a provision permitting
trustees to publish notice of the settlor’s death to creditors to insulate
themselves from liability for creditor claims. 203 Any claim not filed
within ninety days after notice had been published was barred. 204 This
statute did not explicitly state that creditors could satisfy claims from
trust assets, but it impliedly recognized their ability to file a claim after
the settlor’s death.
In 1986, the California Law Revision Commission was charged
with drafting a comprehensive trust code. 205 The California legislature
enacted the proposed trust code in 1990. 206 California Probate Code
Section 19001 provided:
Upon the death of a settlor, the property of the deceased settlor
that was subject to the power of revocation at the time of the settlor’s death is subject to the claims of creditors of the deceased

as to the settlor’s creditors, there is no sound reason to treat the creditors’ rights as suddenly
defeated at the moment the settlor dies, thereby giving the commensurate economic benefit to the
settlor’s heirs. All of the relevant precedent that we have examined seems to support our conclusion.
See, e.g., In re Morris, 151 B.R. 900, 906-07 (C.D.Ill.1993); Johnson v. Commercial Bank, 284 Or.
675, 588 P.2d 1096, 1100 (1978); Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 204
So.2d 856, 862 (Miss.1967); Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 67 A. 52, 53 (1907); see also In re Estate
of Nagel, 580 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1998); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 7 Mass. App.
Ct. 633, 389 N.E.2d 768, 771–72 (1979); Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 27 A.2d
166 (1942).”).
200. Id. at 57-58. See supra notes 160 and 161 and accompanying text.
201. Id. at 58.
202. Id. at 56.
203. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.025 (West, Westlaw through the 28th Spec. Sess. (2014));
S.B. 355, 63d Nev. Leg. (Nev. 1985).
204. Id.
205. CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, RECOMMENDATION PROPOSING THE TRUST LAW 501
(1986).
206. CAL. PROB. CODE Div. 9 Com. (West 2013).
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settlor’s estate and to the expenses of administration of the estate
to the extent that the deceased settlor’s estate is inadequate to satisfy those claims and expenses.

The California Law Revision Commission patterned this provision
after statutes governing creditor claims under the power of appointment
because the powers of revocation and appointment effect a similar
degree of control over trust assets. 207 Since the power to revoke is
actually greater than the power to appoint, creditors’ rights should be
greater, not less. 208 Sections 19002-19012 then established the claims
procedure, including the effect of notifying creditors of the settlor’s
death, the necessity of filing a claim in probate court, and the ability of
the trustee to pay, reject, contest or settle claims against the deceased.209
Iowa followed California’s lead in 1994 and created the Trust Code
Committee to overhaul the state’s trust law. 210 The Trust Code
Committee codified the rule announced by the Iowa Supreme Court in
Phillips v. Roe but introduced two additional elements. 211 First, in
addition to creditor claims, “the trust is subject to the costs of
administration of the settlor’s (probate) estate.” 212 Second, the trust is
subject to estate administrative costs and creditor claims only to the
degree that the settlor’s probate estate is insufficient.213 Subsequent
sections established notice provisions and a statute of limitations in
which to file claims. 214 Thus, lawmakers came to realize what the court
had already realized: trust law was in need of attention, particularly law
governing revocable trusts and creditors’ claims against settlors.
Other states that have not adopted the Uniform Trust Code have
passed legislation regarding this issue. In 2003, Idaho updated its
207. CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 205, at 595; see also Rush Univ., 980 N.E.2d
at 48 (settlor retained power of appointment, and court followed similar reasoning).
208. Rush Univ., 980 N.E.2d at 48. CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 205, at 595
n.384 (citing Richard W. Effland, Rights of Creditors in Nonprobate Assets, 48 MO. L. REV. 431,
440 (1983)).
209. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 19002-12 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.). Some find
California’s claims procedure unnecessarily complicated. See Richard S. Conn, The Need to Clarify
Creditors’ Rights in Probate, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2009, at 80.
210. Martin D. Begleiter, In the Code We Trust – Some Trust Law for Iowa at Last, 49 DRAKE
L. REV. 165, 172 (2001).
211. Id. at 218. See Phillips v. Roe (In re Estate of Nagel), 580 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1998)
(announcing the rule that revocable trusts are subject to creditors’ claims even after the settlor’s
death). The relevant provision was Iowa Code § 633.3104, which was transferred to Iowa Code §
633A.3104 in 2005.
212. Begleiter, supra note 210, at 218.
213. Id.
214. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.3109 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.). Iowa Code Ann.
§ 633.3109 was transferred to Iowa Code Ann. § 633A.3109 in 2005.
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probate code to include a provision regarding the “liability of nonprobate
transferees for creditor claims.” 215 A “nonprobate transfer” is a transfer
effective at death, over which the transferor had the power of revocation
immediately before death. 216 Thus, by definition, this statute governs
revocable trusts. It permits certain claims against the transfer recipients,
when the probate estate is insufficient.217 In 2006, Alaska passed Alaska
Statute section 13.36.268, permitting creditors to satisfy claims from
assets in a trust that was revocable by the settlor at his death to the
degree that the settlor’s probate estate is insufficient. In 2010, Georgia
and South Dakota added similar provisions. 218 Thus, in addition to the
states that have enacted versions of the Uniform Trust Code, the trend in
recent legislation in other states favors creditor rights after the settlor’s
death.
The statistical weight of persuasive authority favors creditor rights.
Out of the forty-four jurisdictions that have enacted statutes governing
trusts and creditors’ rights against settlors, thirty-one, including
Washington, D.C., expressly permit creditors to access revocable trust
funds after the settlor’s death. 219 Four of the thirteen remaining states

215. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-6-107 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 2nd Sess. of the 62nd
legislature).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-82(3) (West, Westlaw through act 2 of 2015 Sess.); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-4-58(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).
219. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Sess. and 2015
Organizational Sess.) (access after death permitted); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.36.368(a)(2) (West,
Westlaw through the 2014 2nd Sess. of the 28th Legis.) (access after death permitted); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-10505(A)(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 legislation of the 52nd legislature)
(access after death permitted); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-505 (West, Westlaw through the 2d Ex.
Sess. (2014)) (does not expressly permit access after death); CAL. PROB. CODE § 19001(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (access after death permitted); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572 (West,
Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, chapter 3) (does not expressly permit access after death); D.C.
CODE § 19-1305.05(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 18, 2015) (access after death permitted);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-111 (West, Westlaw through chapter 2 of the first regular session
of the 70th GA (2015)) (does not expressly permit access after death); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
736.05053(1) (West, Westlaw through chapter 255 of the 2014 Sess. and Spec. “A” Sess. of the
23rd legislature) (access after death permitted); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-82(3) (access after death
permitted); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-6-107(2) (access after death permitted); IND. CODE ANN. § 304-3-2(b) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 23, 2015) (access after death permitted); IOWA CODE §
633A.3109(2) ) (access after death permitted); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw
through the 2014 Sess. and chapter 1 of the 2015 Sess.) (access after death permitted); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2004 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (does not expressly permit access after
death); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 505(1)(C) (West, Westlaw through chapter 1 of the 2015 first
session of the 127th legislature) (access after death permitted); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 203E, §
505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through chapters 1 to 505 of the 2014 2nd Annual Sess.) (access after
death permitted); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7506(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2015,
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specifically address revocable trusts, while six address trusts in which
the settlor retains a beneficiary interest. 220 All of those are silent as to
creditors’ rights after the settlor’s death. 221 Trust codes in the three
No. 4, of the 2015 Sess., 98th legislature) (access after death permitted); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
502.76 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess., chapter 3) (does not expressly permit access after
death); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-505 (West, Westlaw through the 97th GA (2014)) (does not
expressly permit access after death); Adopt the Montana Uniform Trust Code, ch. 264, sec. 70(1)(c),
§ 72-36-302 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Session, and the 2014 general election) (access after
death permitted); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-3850(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.)
(access after death permitted); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.5559 (West, Westlaw through the 28th
Spec. Sess. (2014)) (does not expressly permit access after death); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564B:5-505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through chapter 330 of the 2014 Sess.) (access after death permitted);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:11-1 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, chapter 21) (does not expressly permit
access after death); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-5-505(A)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2nd Sess., 51st
legislature (2014)) (access after death permitted); N.Y. EST. POWER & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1
(McKinney 2014) (does not expressly permit access after death); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-5505(A)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess. of the GA) (access after death permitted); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 59-13-05(1) (2013) (access after death permitted); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5805.06(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 130th GA (2013-2014)) (does not expressly permit
access after death); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.92(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through chapter 430 of the
2nd Sess., 54th legislature (2014)) (does not expressly permit access after death); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 130.315(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (access after death permitted); 20 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 7745(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (access after death permitted); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-7-505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (access after death permitted);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-4-58(a) (access after death permitted); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15505(A)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Sess.) (access after death permitted); TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 112.035(d) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3rd Sess., 83rd legislature) (does not expressly
permit access after death); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-505(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.)
(access after death permitted); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 20132014 GA (2014)) (access after death permitted); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-747(A)(3) (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Sess.) (access after death permitted); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.020 (West,
Westlaw through chapter 4 of 2015 Sess.) (does not expressly permit access after death); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 44D-5-505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (access after death permitted);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.0505(1)(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380) (effective July 1,
2014) (access after death permitted); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-506(d) (West, Westlaw through
2014 Budget Sess.) (access after death permitted).
220. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-505 (specifically addresses creditors and revocable trusts);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 502.76 (specifically addresses creditors and revocable trusts); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A)(1) (specifically addresses creditors and revocable trusts); OKLA. STAT. tit.
60, § 175.92(1)(a) (specifically addresses creditors and revocable trusts); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
38-10-111 (addresses settlor’s beneficiary interest); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572 (addresses
settlor’s beneficiary interest); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2004 (addresses settlor’s beneficiary
interest); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.5559 (addresses settlor’s beneficiary interest); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 112.035(d) (addresses settlor’s beneficiary interest); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.36.020 (addresses settlor’s beneficiary interest).
221. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-505 (permits access to revocable trust assets during
settlor’s lifetime); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-111 (transfer of property into trust for the use of
the settlor void as to settlor’s creditors); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572 (prohibits select creditor
claims against “qualified dispositions” in trust, which must be irrevocable); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2004 (permits access to a beneficiary’s interest in income and principal to the extent that the
beneficiary donated property to the trust); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 502.76 (settlor is deemed absolute
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remaining states, Missouri, New York, and New Jersey, are also silent as
to creditors’ rights after the settlor’s death,222 but other statutes and case
law indicate that creditors can reach trust assets after the settlor’s death
in those jurisdictions. 223 Missouri has a statute outlining creditors’ rights
when a probate estate is bankrupt, and Missouri courts have held that
revocable trust assets can be expended to cover their claims. 224 New
York’s statute governing the general power of revocation provides,
“Where a creator reserves an unqualified power of revocation, he
remains the absolute owner of the property disposed of so far as the
rights of his creditors or purchasers are concerned.” 225 New York courts
have held that this statute encompasses revocable trusts and claims
asserted against deceased settlors. 226 New Jersey common law has also
authorized creditors to claim revocable trust funds after the settlor’s
death. 227 None of the six remaining states have considered the effect of

owner of transferred property in so far as creditors are concerned when reserves power of
revocation); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-505 (permits access to revocable trusts during settlor’s
lifetime and outlines procedure to notify settlor’s creditors of settlor’s death when trustee has power
or duty to pay deceased settlor’s debts); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.5559 (prohibits creditors from
satisfying claims from trust assets if settlor’s sole interest in trust is the existence of a discretionary
power granted to a person other than the settlor unless the transfer was fraudulent); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A)(1) (permits access to revocable trust during settlor’s lifetime); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 60, § 175.92(1)(a) (permits access to revocable trusts during settlor’s lifetime and
invalidates spendthrift provisions while trust is revocable); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d)
(provides that a spendthrift provision will not prevent creditors from satisfying claims from interest
in trust when settlor is also beneficiary); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.020 (West, Westlaw
through chapter 4 of 2015 Sess.) (transfer of property into trust for the use of the settlor void as to
settlor’s creditors).
222. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-505 (permits access to revocable trusts during settlor’s
lifetime and outlines procedure to notify settlor’s creditors of settlor’s death when trustee has power
or duty to pay deceased settlor’s debts); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:11-1 (provides that settlor’s interest
in trust income and principal is subject to creditors’ claims regardless of a spendthrift provision);
N.Y. EST. POWER & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 2014) (provides that disposition in trust for
settlor’s use is void as to creditors).
223. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.300; Anderson v. Fischer (In re Estate of Fischer), 901
S.W.2d 239, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); N.Y. EST. POWER & TRUSTS LAW § 10-10.6 (McKinney
2014); In re Estate of Martin, 686 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); In re Estate of
Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d 852, 858-59 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Pr. Div. 1975).
224. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.300; Anderson, 901 S.W.2d at 240.
225. N.Y. EST. POWER & TRUSTS LAW § 10-10.6 (McKinney 2014).
226. See In re Martin, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 196-97 (applying § 10-10.6 to a revocable trust at the
settlor’s death).
227. See In re Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d at 858-59 (allowing creditors to satisfy decedent’s debts
from trust assets, noting that “[d]ecedent did not intend to strip himself of control of or access to
these funds during his lifetime, intending only to give to the beneficiary what was left, if anything,
at his death. If he had terminated the trust during his lifetime in order to pay his debts, no one could
have complained.”).
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the settlor’s death on creditor claims to revocable trust assets, 228 except
for Illinois, which protects creditor rights through its common law. 229
Thus, approximately 78% of jurisdictions with laws addressing
creditors’ claims to trust assets allow access after the settlor’s death,
while none expressly prohibit it. 230 More important than the statistical
trend, however, is the reasoning provided by other jurisdictions in
support of that trend. As more individuals use revocable trusts in their
estate plans and pass their assets on without going through probate, the
law must adapt.
C. Permitting Creditors Access to the Assets of a Revocable Trust is a
Question of Statutory Amendment for the Legislature
If Ohio is to permit creditors to satisfy claims from revocable trust
assets after the settlor’s death, the question arises whether the judiciary
or the legislature is the more appropriate body for establishing such a
rule. In order to answer that question, it is necessary to determine
whether current provisions of the Ohio Revised Code permit courts to
incorporate this rule into the common law. If the new rule supplements
228. These states include Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, and Rhode Island. A
Connecticut court sitting in probate jurisdiction was faced with this issue but held that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the trust and did not reach the merits. See LeFevre v. LeFevre, No.
CV064006595, 2012 WL 3264051, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 16, 2012); see also Greenwich
Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d 166, 173 (Conn. 1942) (holding that, after the settlor’s death, his
creditors were entitled to satisfy his debts from trust income to which settlor was entitled while
living). Hawaii common law has established that creditors can satisfy a settlor’s debts from
revocable trust assets but has not decided whether this applies to a deceased settlor. See Holualoa
Aloha, LLC v. Anekona Aloha, LLC, No. 30068, 2013 Haw. App. LEXIS 134, at *4 (Feb. 27,
2013) (holding that creditors could reach revocable trust funds to fulfill living settlor’s debt); Cooke
Trust Co. v. Lord, 41 Haw. 198, 201 (1955) (same). Kentucky has no statutory or common law
precisely on point. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386A (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation) (no
provisions governing revocable trusts and settlor’s creditors); Farmers Nat’l Bank of Danville, Ky.
v. Young, 179 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944) (remanding case involving distribution of trust
assets after settlor’s death to advertise for creditor’s claims in order to protect trustee from liability).
The Kentucky legislature, however, did recently introduce its version of the Uniform Trust Code,
which would permit creditors access after death. See H.B. 78, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2014)
(proposing Kentucky Revised Statute § 386B.5-43(1)(c)). Maryland has no statutory or case law
precisely on point. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14 (West 2014) (no provisions governing
revocable trusts and settlor’s creditors); Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bergdorf & Goodman
Co., 173 A.3d 31 (Md. 1934) (holding that creditors could not claim trust assets after settlor’s death
when settlor had exercised her power of revocation to extent permitted under trust instrument,
rendering it irrevocable). Similarly, Rhode Island has no statutory or case law precisely on point.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 18 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (no provisions governing
revocable trusts and settlor’s creditors); Hunt v. Citizens Trust Co., 519 A.2d 1120 (R.I. 1987)
(construing provision of revocable trust instrument).
229. See Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d 45, 58 (Ill. 2012).
230. See supra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
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current law, the judiciary could adopt it. 231 If, however, it contradicts
current statutory law, the legislature must adopt it.
The Ohio Revised Code currently states, “Whether or not the terms
of the trust contain a spendthrift provision . . . [d]uring the lifetime of the
settlor, the property of a revocable trust is subject to the claims of the
settlor’s creditors.” 232 “During the lifetime of the settlor” is the operative
phrase. Does it indicate that creditors’ claims to trust funds are
extinguished once the settlor’s lifetime is over? The Sixth Appellate
District was uncertain and reserved the question for a later date. 233
Nevertheless, legislative intent, supported by canons of statutory
construction, point to the conclusion that the legislature must amend
Ohio’s Trust Code. In this instance, legislative intent may be inferred
from what the Ohio legislature did not do. The Ohio Trust Code is based
on the Uniform Trust Code. 234 From 2000 to 2006, “members of the
Estate Planning, Trust, and Probate Law Section of the Ohio State Bar
Association, and members of the Legal, Legislative, and Regulatory
Committee of the Ohio Bankers League” carefully studied the Uniform
Trust Code and prepared a modified version for Ohio. 235 Notably, this
version omitted the provision enabling creditors’ access to trust funds
after the settlor’s death. 236 Had the legislature intended to protect
creditor rights after the settlor’s lifetime, it would have been a simple
matter of adopting that section of the Uniform Trust Code as is. 237 The
modified version speaks to the legislature’s intent to bar creditor claims
upon the settlor’s death, and legislative intent is paramount in statutory
construction. 238 Canons of statutory construction further evidence the
legislature’s intent to prevent creditors from accessing trust assets after
the settlor’s death. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius suggests that, by
qualifying the statute with “during the lifetime of the settlor,” its
alternative, “after the lifetime of the settlor,” cannot be within legislative

231. See Rush Univ., 980 N.E.2d at 51-54 (the court found that a common law rule
supplemented statutory authority and was thus able to adopt it as the rule in Illinois). This does not
necessarily suggest that the judiciary is the best body for establishing the rule but merely that the
judiciary is capable of establishing the rule.
232. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 130th GA (20132014)).
233. Watterson v. Burnard, 986 N.E.2d 604, 611 n.5. (Ohio. Ct. App. 2013).
234. Newman, supra note 7, at 135-36.
235. Id.
236. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06(A), with UNIF. TRUST CODE ANN. § 505(a)
(West 2013).
237. Ogline, supra note 85, at 6.
238. Wachendorf v. Shaver, 78 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio 1948).
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intent. 239 Likewise, should courts permit creditors access to revocable
trust funds after the settlor’s death, they would render the phrase “during
the lifetime of the settlor” meaningless. This violates the “cardinal rule
of statutory construction that significance and effect should if possible
be accorded every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act.” 240 Thus,
any rule that subjects the property of a revocable trust to creditor claims
upon the death of the settlor contradicts current Ohio law, and the courts
have no power to adopt such a rule.
Policy considerations also suggest that the legislative amendment is
the better method. An effective law will be comprehensive, addressing
potential problems before they arise. It should enable settlors to make
accurate estate plans, provide clear guidance to creditors regarding how
and when to file claims, and outline the trustee’s duties in this situation.
Judicial opinions are ill suited to this sort of detail. For example, the
Iowa Supreme Court announced the rule that revocable trust property is
subject to creditor claims even after the settlor’s death, provided that the
probate estate is insufficient to satisfy them. 241 Even so, the Iowa
legislature found it essential to draft clarifying legislation in the face of
increased use of revocable trusts as estate planning devices. 242 Similarly,
the comments to the Uniform Trust Code provision emphasized the gaps
left by its general rule:
This section does not attempt to address the procedural issues raised by
the need first to exhaust the decedent’s probate estate before reaching
the assets of the revocable trust. Nor does this section address the priority of creditor claims or liability of the decedent’s other nonprobate
243
assets for the decedent’s debts and other charges.

Filling in these gaps is a task better left to the legislature, and it is the
legislature that should draft Ohio’s new law governing creditor access to
assets of revocable trusts.
D. Potential Pitfalls Can Be Avoided with Careful Drafting
The final issue is how to draft a statute that does justice to creditor
rights but also gives effect to the settlor’s intent, preserves some benefits

239. “Where a statute expressly and specifically mentions certain things, other things
belonging to the same class or occurring at the same time are excluded under the maxim, ‘Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.’” Weirick v. Mansfield Lumber Co., 117 N.E. 362, 363 (Ohio 1917).
240. Wachendorf, 78 N.E.2d at 374.
241. Phillips v. Roe (In re Estate of Nagel), 580 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1998).
242. See IOWA CODE § 633A.3104 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.).
243. UNIF. TRUST CODE ANN. § 505(a)(3) cmt. (West 2013).
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of avoiding probate, and protects beneficiaries from becoming embroiled
in the settlor’s failure to satisfy his obligation. First, it is essential to
define “creditor.” Those seeking to limit creditor access to trust funds
have argued that “creditor” means someone who has obtained a
monetary judgment against the settlor. 244 Defining creditor as “judgment
creditor,” however, contradicts its use in everyday language, persuasive
authority, and Ohio precedent. “Creditor” is simply “[o]ne to whom a
debt is owed,” 245 while a “debtor” is “[o]ne who owes an obligation to
another, esp[ecially] an obligation to pay money.” 246 None of the cases
in other jurisdictions that allowed creditors access to revocable trusts
required them to have obtained a judgment or even filed a claim prior to
the settlor’s death. 247 In fact, under current Ohio law, “judgment
creditors” are permitted to satisfy their claims from trust assets. Both the
Third and Sixth Appellate Districts agreed that merely initiating
litigation to obtain a judgment was sufficient to meet the requirements of
O.R.C. section 5805.06. 248 Thus, any other definition would actually
restrict creditor rights more than the status quo. “Creditor,” furthermore,
includes existing and subsequent creditors, i.e., those whose claims arose
prior to the trust’s creation and those whose claims arose after its
creation. The Schofield court distinguished between the two: it noted that
creditors lend on the basis of what someone has – not what someone
used to have – suggesting that only existing creditors can challenge a
trust. 249 This distinction, however, is no longer relevant, as trust assets
can be accessed regardless of fraud and as O.R.C. section 5805.06 does
not differentiate between existing and subsequent creditors.250 Thus,
preserving this distinction would restrict rather than expand creditor
rights.
Second, it is necessary to inquire under what circumstances
creditors should be permitted access to revocable trust funds. The
answer to that inquiry is simple: creditors should be permitted access to
244. See Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d 45, 54-55 (Ill. 2012) (defendant argued
that “creditor” meant judgment creditor).
245. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (8th ed. 2004).
246. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 433 (8th ed. 2004).
247. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 389 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Mass. 1979); In re Estate
of Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d 852, 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. Pr. Div. 1975); Phillips v. Roe (In re Estate of
Nagel), 580 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1998); Johnson v. Commercial Bank, 683 P.2d 1096, 1100 (Or.
1978); Giles v. Ingrum, 583 So.2d 1287, 1288 (Ala.1991); Rush Univ., 980 N.E.2d at 58.
248. See Sowers v. Luginbill, 175 Ohio App. 3d 745, 889 N.E.2d 172, 2008-Ohio-1486, at ¶
28; Watterson v. Burnard, 986 N.E.2d 604, 610 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
249. See Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 21 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 1939).
250. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5805.06(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 130th GA
(2013-2014)).
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revocable trust funds when the probate estate is insufficient to satisfy
their claims. Probate procedure was designed to handle just these sorts of
issues and has always emphasized creditor protection. 251 Initiating other
procedures unnecessarily would only complicate and prolong an already
complicated and prolonged probate process. This approach is in keeping
with Ohio precedent in an analogous case, In re Howald’s Trust. 252 In
that case, the Tenth Appellate District construed a will and a trust
agreement to determine how the decedent’s debts should be paid. 253 It
concluded, “[T]he personal estate of the donee must be exhausted in
payment of her debts before calling on the trustee for a contribution out
of the appointed property.” 254 Every jurisdiction that allows creditors to
file claims against revocable trusts does so only when the probate estate
is exhausted, further confirming the wisdom of this approach.255 The
251. Schwickerath, supra note 3, at 770.
252. Ohio Nat’l Bank of Columbus v. Shawan (In re Howald’s Trust), 29 N.E.2d 575, 583
(Ohio Ct. App. 1940).
253. Id. at 577-80.
254. Id. at 576.
255. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-505(a)(3) (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.36.368(a)(2)
(2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10505(A)(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 legislation of
the 52nd legislature); CAL. PROB. CODE § 19001(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (access
after death permitted); D.C. CODE § 19-1305.05(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 18, 2015); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 736.05053(1) (West, Westlaw through chapter 255 of the 2014 Sess. and Spec. “A”
Sess. of the 23rd legislature); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-82(3) (West, Westlaw through act 2 of 2015
Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-6-107(2) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 2d Sess. of the 62nd
legislature); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-2(b) (West, Westlaw through February 23, 2015); Rush
Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ill. 2012); IOWA CODE § 633A.3109 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2014
Sess. and chapter 1 of the 2015 Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 505(1)(C) (West, Westlaw
through chapter 1 of the 2015 first session of the 127th legislature); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
203E, § 505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through chapters 1 to 505 of the 2014 2d Annual Sess.); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7506(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2015, No. 4, of the 2015 Sess.,
98th legislature); MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.300 (West, Westlaw through the 97th GA (2014));
Anderson v. Fischer (In re Estate of Fischer), 901 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Adopt the
Montana Uniform Trust Code, ch. 264, sec. 70(1)(c), § 72-36-302 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30-3850(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:5-505(a)(3)
(West, Westlaw through chapter 330 of the 2014 Sess.); In re Estate of Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d
852,858-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Pr. Div. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-5-505(A)(3) (West, Westlaw
through 2nd Sess., 51st legislature (2014)); N.Y. EST. POWER & TRUSTS LAW § 10-10.6 (McKinney
2014); In re Estate of Martin, 686 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 36C-5-505(A)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess. of the GA); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
59-13-05(1) (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.315(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014
Sess.); 20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7745(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-4-58(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-505(A)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2nd.
Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-505(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14A, § 505(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2013-2014 GA (2014)); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2747(A)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44D-5-505(a)(3) (West,
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trustee’s obligation to the probate estate would arise only after the
executor provided notice that the probate estate was inadequate,
insulating the trustee from liability for good faith distributions to the
trust beneficiaries. 256
Third, the trustee’s duties respecting creditors, and creditors’
obligations respecting claims, must be outlined. Scholarship suggests
that trustees should provide notice of the settlor’s death to creditors. 257
Many statutes that provide for notice emphasize that the trustee is under
no obligation to publish notice. 258 Instead, providing notice serves to
insulate the trust and trustee from liability for untimely or improperly
filed claims. 259 The solution is to establish degrees of obligation
commensurate to the degree of the trustee’s knowledge of each creditor
and potential claims, with a general publication of notice as a fall
back. 260 For instance, South Dakota’s statute outlines notification
procedures for unknown creditors, known creditors, and creditors who
have already filed claims: notice by publication, actual notice, and no
notice. 261 Creditors must notify the trustee of their claims and file their
claims within a limited time period, not longer than one year. 262 The
trustee could further limit this time period by providing notice, thus
accelerating the claims process. 263
V. CONCLUSION
The Ohio legislature should amend the Ohio Trust Code to permit
Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.0505(1)(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2013
Act 380) (effective July 1, 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-506(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014
Budget Sess.).
256. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-3850(a)(5).
257. See Helen B. Jenkins, Creditors’ Rights to Actual Notice of Revocable Trust on Death of
Settlor in the Aftermath of Pope: The Blessing of Change, the Sin of Avoidance, and the Forgiving
Solution, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 453, 474 (1995).
258. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 19003-08 (noting that the trustee may provide notice and the
effects of doing so); D.C. CODE § 19-1305.05(d)-(e) (noting that the trustee may provide notice and
the effects of doing so); IOWA CODE § 633A.3109-10 (noting that the trustee may provide notice and
the effects of doing so).
259. See supra note 258.
260. Jenkins, supra note 257, at 469-73.
261. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-4-58(b)-(l) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (also
noting that a trustee will not be liable for proceeding with the payment of claims according to
statutory instruction or trust provision unless the trustee has actual knowledge of a contest or claim).
262. See IOWA CODE § 633A.3109 (barring claims not filed within one year of settlor’s death);
see also D.C. CODE § 19-1305.05(d) (barring claims not brought within six months of notice of
publication).
263. See IOWA CODE § 633A.3109-10 (providing that the one year statute of limitations can be
reduced to four months for notice by publication and thirty days for notice by mail).
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creditors to access the assets of a revocable trust to satisfy the settlor’s
debts after his or her death, regardless of when their claim arose,
provided the settlor’s probate estate is insufficient. Trustees should
provide notice under certain circumstances, and creditors should file
their claims in a timely manner to avoid delaying the trustee’s duties.
The implementation of this rule is supported by persuasive authority. As
issues regarding creditor claims to revocable trust assets arose, state
courts favored creditor claims even after the settlor’s death and looked to
statutory law for support. State legislatures soon fell into line,
particularly after the Uniform Trust Code was drafted, and enacted
legislation solidifying creditor rights. The implementation of this rule is
also in keeping with the long-settled principles of Ohio law and
underlying policy, including protection of creditor rights. A settlor
cannot retain complete control over the property, enjoy its benefits, and
avoid his creditors. The fact that a settlor’s power of revocation
technically expires upon his death should not interfere with this principle
under the limited circumstances previously discussed. Especially as
revocable trusts grow more popular as estate planning devices, Ohio law
should reflect the reality of the situation and require the settlor to be just
before he is generous.
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